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Textual Imagination
Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738 (2001).
Textualism's revival illuminated the judicial imagination at play behind
the search for congressional intent through legislative history.' Brickwood
Contractors, Inc. v. United States2 shows that textualism substitutes
structural interpretation of statutory text to veil even wider-ranging judicial
imagination when gap-filling of statutory ambiguities is necessary.
Textual imagination will be increasingly prevalent as the Supreme
Court's shift to textualism3 outstrips in speed and scope its enunciation of
sufficiently comprehensive and coherent canons of statutory construction to
fill gaps in statutory text. The difficulty is demonstrated by the relationship
between Brickwood and the Supreme Court's opinion that gave rise to it,
Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources.4 This Case Note suggests that judicial imagination is
better constrained by a cross-hatch of textual and historical sources of
textual meaning and congressional intent, rather than a dialectical shift to
only textual sources. Rules on permissible aids should consider reliability,
accessibility, and the democratic character of the sources. This will give
Congress incentive to refine rules on creation of these sources to
incorporate these goals, while creating guides for the courts to prevent
judicial imagination so wide-ranging as to constitute judicial legislation.
1. Textualists argue that the search for legislative intent is often chimerical. ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 32 (1997) (arguing that for "99.99 percent of the issues
of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the
legislative history are bound to be false"); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domlains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533, 548 (1983) (characterizing the search for legislative intent as "wild guesses"); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641-56 (1990)
(summarizing textualist critiques).
2. 49 Fed. CI. 738 (2001).
3. For a description of the Supreme Court's shift away from legislative history since the mid-
1980s, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226-28 (1994).
4. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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I
An excursion into Buckhannon is necessary to understand Brickwood's
context. Buckhannon is a recent example of the Supreme Court's mounting
disregard for legislative history and its concomitant attempt to erect
replacement canons of statutory construction to guide textual interpretation.
The opinion privileged a canon of statutory construction over the legislative
record of congressional intent. Of more imminent and practical impact,
Buckhannon invalidated the catalyst theory of awarding plaintiff's fees to
"prevailing parties" under statutes authorizing private attorneys general to
bring suit, overturning the rule of every circuit except the Fourth and
Federal Circuits.5 The theory prevents a defendant from avoiding an award
of attorney's fees through tactics like mooting a promising suit, by positing
that a litigant may still "prevail" by obtaining relief without judgment. The
Court held that the theory did not apply to suits under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA).6
The Court's dicta might be interpreted as rendering the catalyst theory
inapplicable to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other major civil rights
statutes.
7
Like many situations where the catalyst theory is invoked, the
Buckhannon facts involved a defense of civil rights. In 1996, West Virginia
state law required that all residents of residential board and care homes be
capable of "self-preservation" in emergencies, such as fleeing a fire.' State
officials ordered Buckhannon Board and Care Home to close because it
housed three elderly residents not capable of self-preservation.9 The care
home sued, arguing that the law violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The suit survived
summary judgment, but was dismissed as moot when, later that year, the
state legislature enacted two bills eliminating the self-preservation
requirement." The care home requested attorney's fees as the "prevailing
party" according to the catalyst theory." The Fourth Circuit denied the
5. Id. at 626 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing cases from circuits recognizing the catalyst
rule). In 1994, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, parted from its sister circuits, reading the
Supreme Court's dicta in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), to require a plaintiff to obtain
"an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement" to be deemed prevailing. S-1 & S-2 v.
State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994). The Federal Circuit never considered the issue.
6. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600 (interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (1994), and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619).
7. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 624 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Section 1988 was
.patterned upon the attorney's provisions contained in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and § 402 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975."' (citations omitted)).
8. Id. at 600 (majority opinion).
9. Brief of Petitioner at 2-3, Buckhannon (No. 99-1848).
10. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
I1. The fees were requested under the FHAA, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), which provides that
"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee and
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motion under its holding in S-1 & S-2 v. State Board of Education," where
it broke ranks with its sister circuits to hold the catalyst theory invalid.'3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.'4
The Court's 5-4 decision ultimately hinged on the meaning of
"prevailing party." Webster's Third New International Dictionary offered a
broader definition that could embrace the catalyst theory, while Black's
Law Dictionary offered a narrower definition. 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, used two textualist tools to render ambiguous text
"plain" in meaning. He first applied the canon that legal terms of art
susceptible to multiple meanings will be defined by their legal meaning."
Thus, the majority followed Black's Law Dictionary's definition of
"prevailing party" as one that wins judgment. 7 He also harmonized the
provision at issue with the wider body of law 8 by knitting together prior
decisions 9 governing the threshold "judgment" necessary, holding that
costs," and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, which states that "the court... in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and
costs."
12. 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994).
13. See supra note 5.
14. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 530 U.S. 1304
(2000).
15. Compare Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the definition of
"prevailing" in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1797 (1976) as meaning
to "gain victory by virtue of strength or superiority: win mastery: triumph"), with id. at 603
(majority opinion) (citing the definition in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999) of
"prevailing party" as "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount
of damages awarded (in certain cases, the court will award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party).-Also termed successful party").
16. Id. at 603 (majority opinion) ("Congress employed the term 'prevailing party,' a legal
term of art."); see also id. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Words that have acquired a specialized
meaning in the legal context must be accorded their legal meaning.").
17. Id. at 603 (majority opinion).
18. Id. at 605 (" [Ilit behooves us to reconcile the plain language of the statutes with our prior
holdings."). Compare this with recommendations by archtextualist and Supreme Court Justice
Scalia on rendering open-textured language unambiguous:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord
with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the
whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens
subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume
Congress always has in mind.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 623-24 (stating that textualists confirm the apparent meaning of
statutory text by resort to the "structure of the statute, interpretations given similar statutory
provisions; and canons of statutory construction").
19. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (holding that a party who achieves only a
nominal award of damages could satisfy the requirement); Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983) (holding that a party that succeeded on some but not all claims constituted a prevailing
party); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980) (awarding attorney's fees after plaintiffs
obtained a court-ordered consent decree).
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"enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees
create the 'material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties'
necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees." 20
The majority discounted clear statements in committee reports
contradicting its outcome. Chief Justice Rehnquist prefaced his review of
the committee reports with a dismissal, stating, "We doubt that legislative
history could overcome what we think is the rather clear meaning of
'prevailing party'-the term actually used in the statute. Since we resorted
to such history in [past cases], however, we do likewise here." 2 The Senate
Report for 42 U.S.C. § 1988, on which the ADA and FHAA provisions
were modeled, stated that "parties may be considered to have prevailed
when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally
obtaining relief. ' 22 Similarly, the House Report stated that "the phrase
'prevailing party' is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry
of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits." 23 The reports also
referenced an Eighth Circuit case that followed the catalyst theory. 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist characterized these statements as "ambiguous" and
"insufficient to alter the accepted meaning of the statutory term."25 As a
result, the canon concerning legal terms of art trumped the form of
legislative history deemed most reliable by adherents of intentionalist and
purposivist schools of statutory interpretation.26 The canon on legal terms of
art also trumped another of the Court's canons: to interpret the attorney's
fees provisions enacted by Congress so as to give the provisions effect.2 7
II
Buckhannon spurred the Brickwood court to reconsider its grant of
attorney's fees.2" The controversy in Brickwood arose from a Navy-issued
Invitation for Bids to perform repair and environmental impact assessment
20. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)).
21. ld. at 607.
22. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at5 (1976).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 7 (1976).
24. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (awarding
attorney's fees to the plaintiff because his "lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the
[defendant) to take action ... seeking compliance with the requirements of Title VII").
25. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
26. ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 222 tbl. (listing committee reports as the most authoritative).
27. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("'The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.' It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute' rather than to emasculate an entire section." (quoting NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); and Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1882))).
28. Brickwood, 49 Fed. CI. at 739 (describing the review of the prior decision as spurred by
Buckhannon).
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work. Brickwood Contractors submitted the lowest of five bids, but the
Navy later decided to exclude the environmental work. As a result,
Brickwood Contractors no longer had the lowest bid. Seeking award of the
contract, it filed suit, alleging that the Navy did not have the authority to
convert the Invitation for Bids. After a hearing on the claim, but before
judgment, the Navy cancelled the solicitation altogether, and Brickwood's
suit was dismissed as moot. Brickwood then filed suit under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA),29 requesting attorney's fees and expenses.30
On April 9, 2001, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that Brickwood
Contractors was a "prevailing party" for fee-shifting purposes under the
catalyst theory.31 On May 29, 2001, the Supreme Court decided
Buckhannon, and the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment.3 2
The Brickwood court used textualist interpretation to cabin
Buckhannon's reach through a startling act of judicial imagination couched
as structural interpretation unconstrained by legislative history. Brickwood
noted that Buckhannon's holding was limited to the FHAA and the ADA,
and statutes interpreted by courts to have similar attorney's fees
provisions.33 No mention was made of the EAJA.34 The question reduced to
whether the EAJA's meaning of "prevailing party" could be distinguished
from Buckhannon's "prevailing party" provisions. The inquiry would have
been simple had the Brickwood court turned to legislative history. The
Third and Sixth Circuits, as well as the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, had read "the legislative history of section 2412 [to] indicate[] that
Congress intended that 'prevailing party' as used in the [EAJA] be read
consistently with other fee-shifting statutes." 35
Disregarding legislative history altogether, Brickwood reasoned that,
unlike the statutes at issue in Buckhannon, the EAJA contains a
presumption that attorney's fees "shall" be awarded to the prevailing party,
"unless the court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust." " Because the court had to inquire into whether the United States's
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
30. Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 740.
31. Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v, United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2001) (ruling that a
party may be considered prevailing for fee-shifting purposes if its lawsuit is a "causal, necessary,
or substantial factor in obtaining the result plaintiff sought").
32. Brickwood, 49 Fed. C1. at 739.
33. Id. at 744 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001)).
34. Id.
35. Vaughn v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 119, 120 (2001); see Heeren v. City of Jamestown, 39
F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 1994); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir.
1994); Lematta v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 504, 508 (1996). The courts relied on House and Senate
reports on the EAJA.
36. Brickwood, 49 Fed. Cl. at 746 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (emphasis added)).
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position was substantially justified, "[e]ven if there occurred a voluntary
change in the conduct of the government for an EAJA claim, the court
would have to assess the merits of the government's action." 37 Therefore,
"under [the] EAJA, the term 'prevailing party' must mean something
different from the term 'prevailing party' used in the fee-shifting provisions
examined and referenced in Buckhannon."38
Fidelity to Buckhannon's disregard for legislative history thus left the
Brickwood court to extrapolate congressional intent from statutory design, a
mode advocated by textualists.39 Unlike the Buckhannon Court, the
Brickwood court imagined Congress as a body of legislators who look to
effect, rather than lawyers who look to strict design. The analysis both
showed solicitude for congressional intent and conformed with
Buckhannon's dismissal of legislative history.
As with any act of imagination, however, the Brickwood court's
conception is contestable. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
expressly rejected the Brickwood court's act of imagination, relying on
legislative history to invalidate the catalyst theory under the EAJA.4 In
critiquing the Brickwood court's reasoning, the Veterans Claims Court
offered a contrary imagination of congressional intent based on structural
design. The Veterans Claims Court surmised that the additional
"substantial justification" requirement in the EAJA may have been added
as a protection against unworthy applications, since the EAJA, unlike the
FHAA and ADA, gives no discretion to the court once the appellant
establishes eligibility."a This contrary holding highlights the difficulty with
textual imagination: The range of stories judges can posit is as wide as the
limits of credulity. Moreover, credulity under structural analysis loses the
additional constraint of legislative history.
III
Brickwood illustrates that wide judicial imagination lurks at the
opposite end of the pendulum swing from free-wheeling use of legislative
history. Ironically, the dialectical shift to what Judge Wald termed
"blinders jurisprudence" 42 is justified as a move to restrain willful
37. Id.
38. Id. at 747.
39. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 623-24.
40. Thayer v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 204, 208-09 (2001) (citing the discussion of legislative
history in Lematta, 8 Vet. App. 504).
41. Id. at 209 (citation omitted).
42. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 303
(1990).
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judging.43 To accomplish this purpose calls for a balance of interpretive
tools that will constrain the ambit for imagination and yield more stable and
reproducible results among courts. Logically, this calls for amplifying
congressionally created constraints on judicial imagination. The number of
constraints must be limited, however.
Substantive rules on permissible sources can respond to textualist
concerns over the antidemocratic nature of legislative history.' Limitations
should be couched in terms of the reliability of the sources as measured by
their relative ability to reflect democratically agreed understandings, rather
than unilateral or factional insertions. Sources can be further distinguished
by their relative abilities to serve the public notice function of law, in terms
of brevity and accessibility. Such substantive limitations may condition
Congress to refine procedures for the creation of acceptable sources to
facilitate reliability and accountability.4" Congress has a strong stake in
seeing its statutory goals furthered, rather than thwarted, by courts.4 6
Even improved by such substantive limitations, historical sources
remain imperfect substitutes for statutory text. Their importance is as tools
to constrain judicial imagination, working in concert with textualist tools.
The constraints must be checks on each other-that is, a cross-hatching of
horizontal and vertical sources indicating statutory purpose and textual
meaning." Vertical, historical sources like legislative history may be a
check on horizontal sources of evidence like the larger body of law or other
provisions in the statute.
This balancing may sound like Goldilocks's efforts to find something
"just right," but the dialectics of the past point to a surer path.
Intentionalism's mistake before textualism's renaissance was overemphasis
on legislative history at the expense of downplaying the importance of
text.4 s Intentionalism's second mistake was multiplying the acceptable
43. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 18 (critiquing the search for intent as leading to a substitution of
what judges believe the law ought to be).
44. E.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17 (likening the search for intent to Roman Emperor
Nero's practice of posting laws high so that the populace could not read them); id. at 30 (arguing
law is the will of the majority of both houses); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easlerbrook, J.) (" Desires become rules only after clearing procedural hurdles, designed to
encourage deliberation and expose proposals (and arguments) to public view and recorded
vote.").
45. Compare this project with the efforts of the Rehnquist Court to condition Congress to
conform with canons of statutory interpretation to facilitate clear statements.
46. See Statutory interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990) (recording concern on the part of both Republican and
Democratic legislators over decreasing reliance on legislative history).
47. Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., described the distinction between horizontal and
vertical sources of evidence regarding congressional intent. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 655.
48. Id. at 625 (describing textualism's contribution as drawing attention to statutory text and
"reminding courts and attorneys that legislative history is, at best, secondary and supporting
evidence of statutory meaning").
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sources of legislative history, though the reliability of sources varies."9
Textualism's peril is removing the cross-hatch of vertical, historical
constraint on the judicial imagination." The recent experience of English
courts' historic, narrow embrace of a limited number of legislative sources
under prescribed conditions in Pepper v. Harte ' points to the possibility of
convergence based on practices at opposite ends of the dialectical
pendulum. For many years, English courts allowed resort only to White
Papers and official reports regarding the "'mischief sought to be
corrected," '  but forswore any parliamentary materials as aids in
construction. The English courts still allow resort only to legislative
materials where a statute "is ambiguous or obscure or [where] the literal
meaning... leads to an absurdity"-and then, only where such material
"clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention." 54
England is still in transition to an appropriate balance and its current
rules are not sufficiently mature to serve as a model. Its approach does not
completely account for the fact that statutes may not appear ambiguous
until resort to legislative history is had,55 or that legislatures often have a
specific intent regarding only a few applications of a statute, and novel facts
may arise about which the legislature never formed an intent.56 In the latter
case particularly, a degree of judicial imagination is necessary. The key is
that a limited and prescribed set of legislative history materials should be
available in all circumstances to constrain the parameters of imaginative
space. This will best keep judicial imagination from becoming judicial
legislation that defeats important congressional objectives, like maintaining
the viability of private attorneys general.
-Mary D. Fan
49. Even nonlegislators' comments are taken into consideration. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 3,
at 222 tbl.
50. Wald, supra note 42, at 285 (" [Tihe textualist view logically points to a full-scale attack
on the use of any and all extra-statutory materials under any and all circumstances.").
51. Pepper v. Hart, 1993 A.C. 593 (H.L. 1992).
52. Id. at 635 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
53. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J.
371,374.
54. Pepper, 1993 A.C. at 634.
55. Michael P. Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the
United States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 231, 250
(1999) (observing that post-Pepper courts are more likely to find a statute ambiguous when text
contradicts legislative history).
56. United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1952). Judge Learned Hand wrote:
When we ask what Congress "intended," usually there can be no answer, if what we
mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may,
what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of
those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the
concrete occasion. He who supposes that he can be certain of the result is the least
fitted for the attempt.
Id. at 648.
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